Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, LC and White Investment Co., Inc. v. Wendy\u27s Old Fashioned Hamburgers of New York, Inc. : Reply Brief by Utah Court of Appeals
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs
2006
Papanikolas Brothers Enterprises, LC and White
Investment Co., Inc. v. Wendy's Old Fashioned
Hamburgers of New York, Inc. : Reply Brief
Utah Court of Appeals
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Ronald G. Russell; Parr, Waddoups, Brown, Gee & Loveless; counsel for appellee.
Michael Z. Hayes, Todd J. Godfrey; Mazuran & Hayes; counsel for appellant.
This Reply Brief is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of Appeals
Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.
Recommended Citation
Reply Brief, Papanikolas Brothers v. Wendy's Old Fashioned, No. 20060350 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2006).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/6437
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS 
ENTERPRISES, LC and WHITE 
INVESTMENT CO., INC., 
Plaintiffs/Appellants, 
vs. 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED 
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, 
INC., 
Defendant/Appellee. 
Case No. 20060350 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 
Appeal from a Final Order Granting Summary Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, Utah, 
Honorable Judge J. Dennis Frederick, Case No. 040915948 
Ronald G.Russell (4134) 
Matthew J. Ball (9414) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN 
GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, UT 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801) 532-7840 
Fax: (801) 532-7750 
Counsel for Defendant/Appellee 
Michael Z.Hayes (1432) 
Todd J. Godfrey (6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Telephone: (801) 272-8998 
Fax:(801)272-1551 
Counsel for Plaintiffs/Appellants 
FILED 
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS 
NOV 222006 
IN Til I UTAH < OlIKTOF APPEALS 
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS 
ENTERPRISES, LC and WHITE 
INVESTMENT CO., INC., 
I l i i in l i r ' t ' s /Appc ' l la i i l 
vs. 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED 
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, 
INC., 
lVi>ndant/Ar XHLX. 
Case No. 20060350 
REPLY BRIEF OF THE PLAINTIFFS/APPELLANTS 
Appeal from a Final Order Granting Summary Judgment 
of the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, ?, 
Honorable Judge J. Dennis Frederick, Case No. 040915948 
Ronald G.Russell (4134) 
Matthew J. Ball (9414) 
PARR WADDOUPS BR< >\VN 
GEE & LOVELESS 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Bt^ ! id •• 
Salt Lake Cit\, I I 84 U" 0019 
Telephone: (80h *3:-~84< 
Fax: (801) 5^-77c« 
Counsel1 ' -r ' •• ! e 
,-,,v,,aci L. Mayes u <--) 
Todd J. Godfrey (6094) 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
2118 East 3900 South, Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, UT 84124 
Telephone: (801) 272-8998 
Fax:(801)272-1551 
Counsel for PlaintifIsl\\»pe11<ii)I'• 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES ii 
ARGUMENT 1 
I. THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
DECLARATION REGARDING THE LOCATION OF THE 
DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES WAS INCORRECT 1 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT CONSENTED TO THE LOCATION 
OF THE DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITY ON THEIR PROPERTY 5 
III. WENDY'S ADDITIONAL MENU BOARD SIGNS ARE IN 
VIOLATION OF THE DECLARATION 8 
IV. EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD CLEARLY INDICATES THAT 
WENDY'S CONSTRUCTED NEW FACILITIES ON 
PLAINTIFFS' PROPERTY AND TRESPASSED IN DOING SO 12 
CONCLUSION 13 
i 
TABLE OF AUTHORITIES 
CASES 
Carrier v. Salt Lake County, 
2004 UT 98113, 104 P.3d 1208 5 
Draughon v. CUNA Mutual Insurance Society, 
111 P.2d 1105, 1108, fo3 2 
Gillmore v. Macey, 
2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57 4 
Harris v. IESAssociates, Inc., 
2003 UT App. 112, 69 P.3d 297 7 
Lovendahl v. Jordan School Dist., 
2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705 5, 12 
Smith v. Smith, 
1999 UT App. 370, U 8, 995 P.2d 14, 16 6 
State v. Piep, 
2004 UT App. 7,1} 10, 84 P.3d 850, 852 9 
State v. Thomas, 
961 P.2d 299, 305 (UT 1998) 6 
U.P.C, Inc. v. R.O.A. General, Inc., 
1999 UT App. 303, 990 P.2d 945 8 
OTHER AUTHORITIES 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 5, 6, 7 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 6 
ii 
ARGUMENT 
L THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION OF THE 
DECLARATION REGARDING THE LOCATION OF THE 
DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITIES WAS INCORRECT. 
Wendy's argues that the trial court's interpretation of the Declaration in this 
matter was correct. However, in setting forth this argument, Wendy's mischaracterizes 
the trial court's interpretation and fails to properly acknowledge the relevant language of 
the Declaration in the full context of the contract. The trial court's interpretation of the 
Declaration, as it relates to the Drive-Through Facilities, is set forth in the Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. R. at 375. In the Conclusions of Law, the trial court stated: 
9. Although the Declaration generally forbids the 
construction of improvements on common areas, it expressly 
authorizes Drive Through Facilities located on Parcel Three 
as shown on the Plot Plan. 
10. The Drive Through Facilities are consequently 
excepted from the Declaration's general prohibition of 
improvements on the Common Area and are, in fact, 
expressly permitted. 
11. Because the Drive Through Facilities are 
expressly permitted by the Declaration, Wendy's is entitled to 
a declaratory judgment decreeing that the Drive Through 
Facilities may remain in use in their present location and 
configuration. 
R. at 380. Wendy's characterizes the Declarations language, and the trial court's decision 
to mean that "Thus, so long as the plot plan shows a 'building featuring . . . drive through 
traffic' on Parcel Three, the Declaration expressly authorizes such facilities." Wendy's 
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Brief at p. 10. The actual language, taken in the context of the entire agreement 
represented by the Declaration, demonstrates that the trial court's interpretation, and the 
arguments supporting the same, are incorrect. 
It is a common principle of contract interpretation in Utah that the overall context 
in which a particular provision is used aids in interpretation of the contract. Draughon v. 
CUNA Mutual Insurance Society, 111 P.2d 1105, 1108, fn 3. The Declaration establishes 
a set of covenants and easements for the operation of an overall Shopping Center, 
accounting for separate parcels covered by the terms of the Declaration. It defines 
building areas and common areas within the Shopping Center, establishes easements, 
provides for the maintenance of common areas of the Shopping Center in general, and 
establishes restrictions regarding business on the property. In contemplation of the 
Shopping Center which had yet to be constructed, at the time the Declaration was 
created, a proposed site plan was attached as Exhibit "A." That proposed site plan is 
referred to as the "Plot Plan." The Plot Plan, on its face, does not define a scale. It does, 
however, clearly demonstrate measurements and distances relating to proposed shopping 
center structures. In so doing, a scale can be derived for the Plot Plan. 
While the Declaration affirmatively defines permitted practices and establishes 
and entitles easement rights, it also sets forth restrictions on activity within the Shopping 
Center property. In those restrictions, in Section 6, Paragraph A, it provides: 
No building featuring drive-in, drive-up or drive-through 
traffic shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on 
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the Plot Plan, without the prior consent of the owner of Parcel 
Two and ASPI, including consent to the location of the drive-
in, drive-up or drive-through lanes of such facility. 
The trial court and Wendy's read this provision to be permissive despite its 
language which implies a restrictive meaning. Notwithstanding the fact that the entire 
northerly portion of the drive through was eventually located on a parcel other than 
Parcel Three, Wendy's asserts, and the trial court determined, that the location was 
consistent with the Plot Plan. 
Additionally, there is nothing on the face of the Plot Plan that suggests either party 
contemplated a drive-through lane which would be physically isolated from the other 
Common Area. The curved lines representing the location of the Drive-Through Facility 
on the Plot Plan in no way suggest concrete curbing, raised landscape islands, and 
exclusive possession by Wendy's of portions of the common area located on Parcel One. 
However, that is precisely the circumstance that currently exists. The Declaration, even 
read in the most liberal manner, would only allow a restaurant with drive-through 
facilities located on Parcel Three. A significant portion of the Drive-Through Facilities in 
this case are located on Parcel One which is owned by the Plaintiffs. For these reasons, 
the trial court's interpretation was incorrect. 
In their Brief, Wendy's also states that "Appellants do not dispute that the Drive-
Through Facilities are physically located in the general location shown on the Plot Plan." 
This statement is incorrect. See Brief of Plaintiffs/Appellants, pp. 5-6, «[fl[ 12-13. The 
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purpose of the Mark Babbitt Affidavit was to demonstrate that neither the restaurant on 
Parcel Three nor its appurtenant Drive-Through Facilities were located "as shown on the 
Plot Plan." In fact, Mr. Babbitt's Affidavit unequivocally states his opinion that their 
actual location is not consistent with the Plot Plan. A copy of Mr. Babbitt's Affidavit, 
with the opposing Affidavit of Mr. Smith (both without exhibits), is included in the 
Addendum to this Brief. These two Affidavits, completely disparate in their conclusions, 
show that there were issues of material fact precluding summary judgment. 
Wendy's further asserts: 
Since some variability between a not-to-scale sketch in reality 
is to be expected, the drafters of the Declaration must have 
anticipated and intended to permit drive-through facilities in 
the general location shown on the Plot Plan without regard to 
precise measurements. Had the drafters generally been 
concerned about the exact location of drive-through facilities, 
they would surely have attached a considerably more detailed 
survey or map to the Declaration than the Plot Plan. 
Brief of Wendy's at pp. 11-12. These assertions are unsupported by any evidence. 
Additionally, they run contrary to the trial court's award of summary judgment and the 
procedure and rules on which this case was decided. Wendy's asserts that the trial court's 
decision was correct as a matter of law, but this could only be so if the contract was 
unambiguous. Gillmore v. Macey, 2005 UT App. 351, 121 P.3d 57. 
There is clearly ambiguity in the contract regarding the proposed location of the 
Drive-Through Facilities "[E]xcept as shown on the Plot Plan" is a phrase susceptible of 
differing interpretations and subjective opinion. There is a clear dispute of material fact 
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regarding whether or not the as-constructed improvements are consistent with the Plot 
Plan, Notwithstanding the ambiguity and inconsistent factual positions, Wendy's, 
bolstered by the incorrect decision of the trial court, without basis or support, asserts the 
intent of the drafters of the document. This is particularly interesting in light of the fact 
that Wendy's is a latecomer to the property while Plaintiffs are the original owners. 
Where there are genuine issues of material fact in the matter before the Court on 
summary judgment, summary judgment is inappropriate. Lovendahl v. Jordan School 
Dist., 2002 UT 130, 63 P.3d 705. In this case, where Mr. Babbitt's Affidavit clearly 
introduced a dispute of material fact regarding consistency of the as constructed 
restaurant and drive-through facilities with the Plot Plan, summary judgment should not 
have been granted. 
II. PLAINTIFFS HAVE NOT CONSENTED TO THE 
LOCATION OF THE DRIVE-THROUGH FACILITY ON 
THEIR PROPERTY. 
Wendy's, for the first time on appeal, argues that Plaintiffs consented to the 
location of the Drive-Through Facilities. It is well established that as a general rule, 
appellate courts will not address issues raised for the first time on appeal. Carrier v. Salt 
Lake County, 2004 UT 98 % 13, 104 P.3d 1208. Further, Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, in subsection (a)(9) provides: 
The argument shall contain the contentions and reasons of the 
Appellant with respect to the issues presented, including the 
grounds for reviewing any issue not preserved in the trial 
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court, with citations to the authorities, statutes, and parts of 
the record relied on. 
Based on the provisions of this Rule, Utah courts have noted that on appeal, litigants 
have a duty to adequately brief the contentions and arguments in their briefs. Briefs must 
contain reasoned analysis based upon relevant legal authority. State v. Thomas, 961 P.2d 
299, 305 (UT 1998). An issue is inadequately briefed when "the overall analysis of the 
issue is so lacking as to shift the burden of research and argument to the reviewing 
court." Smith v. Smith 1999 UT App. 370, U 8, 995 P.2d 14, 16, citing State v. Thomas, 
961P.2d299,305. 
In Smith, the court noted that the brief of the Appellant presented three arguments 
supported by five points. In reviewing the adequacy of the brief against the requirements 
of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, the court noted that both the first 
point and the second point failed to cite relevant legal authority. As to the third point, the 
court noted that "it contains little more than a quote from Rule 35(b)(1) of the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure . . . ." Smith, 1999 UT App. 370, ^ 12. It is clear from the opinion that 
the court found the lack of citation to any legal authority fatal. 
In this case, under Point Heading II of its Brief, Wendy's argues that Plaintiffs 
have consented to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities. However, Wendy's fails 
to cite any legal authority to support its argument that the alleged, implied consent of the 
Plaintiffs is legally relevant. Without any support in statutory or common law for the 
theory it argues, it is clear that the burden of research has shifted to the Appellate Court 
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and Wendy's has failed to meet the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
Even if the Court were to consider the consent argument, raised for the first time 
on appeal, it does not appear as though there is any support in Utah law for the assertion 
that Plaintiffs consented to the location of the Drive-Through Facilities. If Wendy's 
argument is construed to suggest that Plaintiffs consented to a modification of the 
contract to allow the facilities to be constructed almost wholly on Plaintiffs' property (as 
opposed to Parcel Three where the Declaration requires), the law of this State regarding 
modification of contracts by consent precludes Wendy's claim. In Harris v. IES 
Associates, Inc., 2003 UT App. 112, 69 P.3d 297, the Court of Appeals noted: 
Parties to a contract may, by mutual consent, modify any or 
all of a contract. . . . A valid modification of a contract . . . 
requires a meeting of the minds of the parties, which must be 
spelled out either expressly or implied with sufficient 
definiteness. 
Harris, 2003 UT App. 112, ^  46. (cites omitted). Here, where neither of the parties, at the 
time of construction of the Drive-Through Facilities, knew the improvements were 
placed outside of Parcel Three, the Court cannot find the required meeting of the minds. 
To the extent Wendy's argues that under the terms of the Declaration, as written, 
it had the right to request approval for the location of the Drive-Through Facilities on 
Plaintiffs' property, and that Plaintiffs were bound by a standard of reasonableness to 
review and approve Wendy's proposal, Utah law also precludes the argument. It is well 
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settled that a court may not make a better contract for the parties than they have made for 
themselves. U.P.C., Inc. v. R.O.A. General Inc., 1999 UT App. 303, 990 P.2d 945. In 
this case, the terms of the Declaration simply require that no Drive-Through Facilities 
shall be located on Parcel Three, except as shown on the Plot Plan, without the consent 
of the owners of Parcels One and Two. There is nothing in the Declaration suggesting 
that where no consent is sought, silence will imply consent. Clearly, as opposed to the 
consent doctrine proposed by Wendy's, this is simply a matter of, at the outset, mutual 
mistake, followed by a knowing trespass. In such circumstances, an allegation of consent 
has no application or relevance under Utah law. 
III. WENDY'S ADDITIONAL MENU BOARD SIGNS ARE IN 
VIOLATION OF THE DECLARATION. 
In its Brief, Wendy's argues that the Declaration expressly permits the menu 
board signs it has erected on its parcel and on Plaintiffs' property. Wendy's construction 
of the Declaration is contrary to basic principles of Utah law. In addition, its argument 
ignores the fact that it has constructed a new menu board sign on Parcel Three, as well as 
a sign wholly located on the Plaintiffs' property. There is no provision of the Declaration 
which authorizes this action. 




Each Owner shall have the right to maintain such signs 
on the interior of buildings located on its parcel as it desires, 
whether or not such signs are visible from the exterior. As 
permitted by local ordinances and other applicable 
governmental regulations, each Owner shall have the right to 
erect, maintain and replace signs on the exterior of buildings 
located on its parcel; provided, in no event shall signs be 
located on the roofs (excluding canopies so long as no sign is 
erected on a canopy which sign will extend above the height 
of the building roof) of any buildings in the Shopping Center 
without the prior written consent of all Owners and ASPI. 
The Owners of Parcels One and Two shall have the 
right to construct from time to time any sign or signs it deems 
advisable on its parcels. 
The Owner of Parcel Three shall have the right to 
construct two (2) free-standing pylon, monument or other 
signs at the located designed on the Plot Plan as ''Parcel 
Three Sign. " No other pylon, monument or other free-
standing sign shall be permitted on Parcel Three without the 
prior written approval of all Owners and ASPL 
R. at 39-40 (emphasis added). Wendy's argues that under the doctrine of ejusdem 
generis, the terms are to be so construed that the menu board signs are not "other free-
standing signs" which would be expressly prohibited by the Declaration. Wendy's asserts 
that the doctrine of ejusdem generis requires the Court to conclude that "other free 
standing signs" includes only signs similar to pylon or monument signs. This is incorrect. 
The doctrine of ejusdem generis, will not apply where the contract language itself 
expresses a contrary intention. State v. Piep, 2004 UT App. 7, 1f 10, 84 P.3d 850, 852. 
More significantly however, the doctrine does not serve to require the court to construe 
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"any other free standing sign," as referring only to "signs similar to pylon or monument 
signs." See Brief of Wendy's at pp. 16-17. The doctrine requires interpretation of the 
term from the context in which it appears. 
In the context of the entire Article VII of the Declaration, and where the Section 
expressly prohibits signs other than at the locations identified on the Plot Plan, the 
reference to "or other free standing signs" cannot be read as Wendy's suggests, but must 
be given the plainly broad intent to include and encompass all other categories of signs. 
To further support their argument, Wendy's has provided dictionary definitions for a 
pylon or a monument. Reference to actual sign ordinances with definitions of pylon 
signs, monument signs and free-standing signs is more instructive. 
Section 9-26-030 of the Draper City Municipal Code, Draper City, Utah, defines a 
"freestanding sign" as "A sign which is self-supported by poles, pylons or other 
structural supports mounted in the ground." Chapter 17.12 of the Sign Ordinance of Big 
Bear Lake, California defines a freestanding sign as "Any sign supported by structures or 
supports that are placed on or anchored in the ground which are independent from any 
building or other structure. This definition may include pole signs, ground signs and 
monument signs." Although the Salt Lake County sign ordinance in effect at the time of 
construction at the Shopping Center does not contain a definition for a "freestanding 
sign," it does contain a definition for a "monument sign" which reads "A sign which is 
incorporated into the landscape or architectural design scheme displaying the name of 
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uses or buildings." A complete copy of the Salt Lake County sign ordinance in effect in 
1983 is included in the Addendum to this Brief. Reference to that ordinance makes it 
clear that in the context of that ordinance, the term "other free-standing sign" would 
include any type of sign except roof signs and those signs attached to a building, such as 
wall signs and projecting signs. The menu board signs constructed by Wendy's would 
certainly be defined as "other free standing signs" in the context of the Salt Lake County 
sign ordinance. 
Reference to the Record also indicates that Wendy's locational characterization of 
signs is incorrect. The photograph at p. 288 in the Record, attached to the Affidavit of 
Steve Marshall, demonstrates two of the signs constructed by Wendy's. The "pick-up 
window" sign in the immediate foreground is located wholly on Plaintiffs' property. 
Plaintiffs believe, and common sense indicates, that such a sign is a "directional sign." 
However, because the sign has been constructed wholly on the Plaintiffs' property, it is 
not permitted under the Declaration. The language of the Declaration indicates that 
Wendy's only has authorization to construct directional signs on Parcel Three. 
The sign in the background of the picture found at p. 288 of the Record is clearly 
not a "directional sign." Accordingly, that sign is also in violation of the express terms of 
the Declaration and must be removed. 
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IV. EVIDENCE IN THE RECORD CLEARLY INDICATES THAT 
WENDY'S CONSTRUCTED NEW FACILITIES ON PLAINTIFFS' 
PROPERTY AND TRESPASSED IN DOING SO. 
In its Brief Wendy's takes issue with Plaintiffs' assertion that Wendy's 
constructed a new fence on Plaintiffs' property. Wendy's asserts that there is no evidence 
in the record to support that assertion. See Brief of Wendy's at p. 19, fn 2. This assertion 
is incorrect. 
The Larsen & Malmquist survey, which is attached to Plaintiffs' Complaint set 
forth at p. 9 of the Record, clearly identifies a chain link fence on the western border of 
the Drive-Through Facilities. However, the photographs beginning at p. 285 of the 
Record clearly show a rod-iron fence in Wendy's corporate colors along the western 
border of the Drive-Through Facilities where the chain link fence was previously located. 
Obviously, Wendy's constructed the rod-iron fence, with one panel on Plaintiffs' 
property, with its renovation of the restaurant. Such construction was clearly not outside 
the applicable statute of limitations. In addition, as previously discussed, the Wendy's 
directional sign as shown on p. 288 of the Record was installed by Wendy's on Plaintiffs' 
property at a time that is clearly within the applicable statute of limitations. Further, 
while Wendy's takes issue in its Brief with Plaintiffs' assertion of the new fence being 
built, Wendy's does not deny that it installed the new sign on Plaintiffs' property. At the 
very least, the evidence creates a genuine issue of material fact which should have 
precluded summary judgment on the trespass issue. Lovendahl, 2002 UT 130. 
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Accordingly, the trial court's decision granting summary judgment on the trespass claims 
was incorrect. 
CONCLUSION 
From the Record in this case it is apparent that the trial court improperly 
interpreted the Declaration. Additionally, the trial court missed significant factual 
disagreements which should have precluded its award of summary judgment to Wendy's. 
Finally, the trial court ignored evidence that Wendy's trespassed on Plaintiffs' property 
to build a fence and install signs, well within the applicable statute of limitations. For all 
of the foregoing reasons, the trial court's summary judgment determination should be 
overturned in its entirety and the case remanded to the trial court for consideration on the 
merits. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this %?J? day of November, 2006. 
MAZURAN & HAYES, P.C. 
Attorneys foFPtamtiffs 
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Ronald G. Russell, Esq. 
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185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 




Michael Z. Hayes and Todd J. Godfrey 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
2118 East 3900 South 
Suite 300 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84124 
Telephone: (801)272-8998 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PAPANIKOLAS BROTHERS ENTERPRISES, LC, 
AND WHITE INVESTMENT COMPANY, INC. 
Plaintiffs, 
vs. 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED 
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC., 
Defendant. 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Mark E. Babbitt, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge 
of the matters stated herein. If called as witness in this case, I would 
testify to the matters stated in this affidavit. 
AFFIDAVIT OF 
MARK E. BABBITT 
Civil No. 040915948PR 
Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
2. I am Vice President of Great Basin Engineering Inc., a civil 
engineering and land surveying firm located in Ogden, Utah. I am also 
a Professional Land Surveyor licensed by the State of Utah holding 
license number 166484 and a Professional Engineer licensed by the 
State of Utah holding license number 6728. 
3. I have reviewed the ALTA/ACSM Land Title Survey for Wendy's 
International Inc. dated 14 November 2002, with general corrections 
dated 18 November, 2002 prepared by Larsen & Malmquist (Larsen) 
and signed by Kim Wayne Lundberg on 19 November, 2002. 
4. I have carefully measured the existing building location and the drive 
thru window access location north of the building with respect to the 
property lines shown on the Larsen survey. (I have measured the 
drawing because there are no North-South dimensions shown on the 
drawing locating the building or access with regard to the property 
lines, however East-West dimensions are shown.) These 
measurements are as follows: Distance from South property line of 
Wendy's (North right-of-way line of 3300 South Street) to the 
southwest corner of building measures approximately 38.3 feet, the 
North-South measurement along the West side of the building 
measures approximately 76.9 feet, the distance from the Northwest 
corner of the building to the North property measures approximately 
25.2 feet. The South edge of curbing along the South side of the drive 
thru access lane appears to approximately match (within 0.5 feet) the 
North property line, for approximately 40 feet (beginning at the 
Northeast corner of the survey and then going West) until the access 
lane begins curving to the South. This access lane is approximately 13 
feet wide and for 40, feet as indicated above, is entirely North of the 
Wendy's Property and then turns South. After approximately 70.5 feet 
from said Northeast corner, the access is entirely on Wendy's 
Property. 
5. The Larsen Survey also shows a landscaped area North of the access 
lane that is maintained as part of the Wendy's facility. This landscaped 
area is bounded by a 6-inch curb wall on the Northerly, Easterly and 
Southerly sides and a retaining wall on the West side. The overall 
landscaped area has an area of approximately 625 square feet with 
approximately 490 square feet North of the Wendy's property line. 
6. The "Plot Plan" appended as Exhibit "A" to the declaration shows the 
building now owned by Wendy's located in the southwest corner of 
Parcel three and also shows by two curved lines located just off the 
northwest corner of the Wendy's building, the drive thru facility which 
serves the Wendy's building. 
7. I have measured the location of the building and the curved lines 
representing the drive thru on the "Plot Plan" (Exhibit A) by measuring 
dimensioned lines throughout Exhibit A and approximating the scale of 
the drawing to be 1" = 125'. Measurements corresponding to those 
stated in Item 3 are as follows: 
North right-of-way line to buiiding 30' + 
North/South Dimension through building 64' + 
Building to North property line of Wendy's 46' + 
Dimensions to north edge of access drive: 
at NE property corner 11.5' + 
at 40'West of NE corner 3' + 
at 51 ' West of NE corner 0' + 
8. The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which is indicative of 
a preliminary layout, not as a constructed drawing or a survey. The 
physical relationship between the location of the restaurant building 
and drive thru as shown on the Plot Plan is not consistent in scale with 
the physical location of the building and drive thru facility as physically 
located on the ground. 
9. The dimensions I have listed in Items 4 and 7 above, although only 
approximate, show a significant difference in the location of the 
building and the drive thru window access. The building on Exhibit A is 
30 feet + from the North right-of-way line versus 38.3 feet on the 
survey. The building in Exhibit A is approximately 64 feet long versus 
76.9 feet on the survey. The North property line in Exhibit A is 
approximately 46 feet from the building versus 25.2 feet in the survey. 
The North edge of the access for the drive thru window in Exhibit A 
angles to the Southwest and is from 2 feet to over 10 feet closer to 
Wendy's north property line than the access shown on Wendy's 
survey. Approximately 480 square feet of the access lane shown on 
the Larsen Survey is North of the North edge of the access lane shown 
on Exhibit 'A'. 
DATED this day of October, 2005. 
luA i/?du4 
Mark E. Babbitt 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this fy day of 
October, 2005 
LAURIE HALL 
NOTARY PU8UC . SMTE of UTJW 
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My Commission Expires: 
/ / - : ? £ - 7L0c>7 
Ronald G. Russell, Esq. (4134) 
PARR WADDOUPS BROWN GEE & LOVELESS 
Attorneys for Defendant 
185 South State Street, Suite 1300 
Post Office Box 11019 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147-0019 
Telephone: (801)532-7840 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
METROPOLITAN SQUARE ASSOCIATES, ] 
Plaintiff, 
vs. ) 
WENDY'S OLD FASHIONED j 
HAMBURGERS OF NEW YORK, INC., ; 
Defendant. 
I AFFIDAVIT OF 
I RANDY D. SMITH 
i Civil No. 040915948PR 
I Judge J. Dennis Frederick 
STATE OF UTAH ) 
: ss. 
COUNTY OF SALT LAKE ) 
Randy D. Smith, being first duly sworn, deposes and states as follows: 
1. I am over the age of twenty-one years and I have personal knowledge of the 
matters stated herein. If called as a witness in this case, I would testify to the matters stated 
in this affidavit. 
2. I am Vice President of Larsen & Malmquist, Inc., a civil engineering firm 
located in Salt Lake City, Utah, I am also a Professional Land Surveyor licensed by the 
State of Utah holding license number 51527Q8. 
3. On November 14, 2002, our office prepared an ALTA/ACSM land title survey 
at the request of Wendy's International of the property located at 3259 East 3300 South, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. I personally performed the field work for the survey of the Wendy's 
property and assisted in the drafting of the survey map. A true and correct copy of the 
survey map prepared by my office of the Wendy's property (the f,LMI Survey") is attached 
hereto marked Exhibit ,fA." 
4. In conducting a survey, it is standard practice to research and locate other 
prior surveys of the subject property. In connection with the preparation of the Wendy's 
survey, I researched and located prior surveys of the property filed with the Salt Lake 
County Surveyor's office, which included surveys prepared by the Salt Lake City surveying 
firm of Bush & Gudgell in-1989 and 1992 (the "B&G Surveys"). Copies of those prior 
surveys are attached hereto marked as Exhibits "B" and "C" 
5. The location and layout of the drive through lane and curbing as shown on the 
LMI Survey is in the same location as shown on the B&G Surveys. 
6. The drive through lane and related curbing are in the same location and same 
configuration as they existed at the time of the LMI Survey and no modification was made 
to the drive through lane and curbing locations or otherwise to the location of the site 
2 
improvements on the Wendy's property during Wendy's renovation of the restaurant 
building. 
7. I have read and I am familiar with the "Declaration of Restrictions and Grant 
of Easements" recorded as Entry No. 3714292, in Book 5410, at Page 823 of the records of 
the Salt Lake County, Utah Recorder and I have reviewed Exhibit "A" attached thereto. A 
true and correct copy of the declaration is attached hereto marked Exhibit "D." 
8. The "Plot Plan" appended as Exhibit "A" to the declaration shows the building 
now owned by Wendy's located in the southwest corner of Parcel Three and also shows, 
by two curved lines located just off the northwest corner of the Wendy's building, the drive 
through facility which serves the Wendy's building. 
9. It is my professional opinion that the curved lines on the Plot Plan depict a 
drive through facility in the same location as the drive through*facility that is shown on the 
LMI Survey and the B&G Surveys and which currently serves the Wendy's restaurant 
10. The Plot Plan is labeled as "Proposed Site Plan," which is indicative of a 
preliminary layout, not an as constructed drawing or a survey. The physical relationship, 
however, between the location of the restaurant building and drive through as shown on 
the Plot Plan is fully consistent in scale with the physical location of the building and drive 
through facility as physically located on the ground. 
11. The line running east and west, located to the north of the Wendy's property, 
does not accurately depict the location of a property line. The north property line of the 
3 
Wendy's parcel, which is accurately depicted on the LMI Survey, runs along the south edge 
of the drive through facility and is on the same line extended as the north side of the 
building located to the west of the Wendy's property, as shown in the photographs 
attached hereto marked Exhibits ME" and "F." 
12. The areas hatched with a dot pattern on the Plot Plan, indicating the location 
of the access drive, are consistent with the layout of the curb, gutter, and parking located to 
the north of the Wendy's building, 
DATED this / ^ day of April, 2005, 
Randy D. Smith 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN to before me this /?** day of April, 2005. 
NOTARY PUBLIC * 
Residing In
 t 
My Commission Expires: Notary PuMIc,~ ^ 
PATRICIA H.URSEN I 
m 1837Gonao*0totf a 
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Sign Ordinance ?V33—1 - 22-33-3 
.'iiapter " 
SIGN ORDINANCE 





22-33-3. Signs to Conform 
22-33-6. Building Permit Exception:; 
22-33-7. Permit Tag 
22-33-8. Legal Action 
22-33-9. Signs Not to Constitute a Traffic Hazard 
22-33-10, Clear View of Intersecting Streets 
22-33-11. Signs on Fublic Property 
22-33-12, Prohibited Signs 
22-33-13. Maintenance of and Abandonment of Sign 
22-33-14, Ownership 
22-33-15. Lighted Signs 
22-33-16. Spacing Requirements For Off-Premise Signs 
22-33-17- Size Computation 
22-33-18. Mobile Changeable Copy Sign 
22-33-19- Signs Allowed by Zones 
Sec. 22-33-1. Purpose. The purpose of this ordinance is to eliminate 
excessive and confusing sign displays that create potential hazards to 
motorists, pedestrians, propertyt and also to maintain a responsible 
communication system by setting requirements for the location, size, height, 
and lighting of signs that will be compatible with the architecture and 
landscape of Salt Lake County. 
Sec, 22-33-2. Interpretation. The sign requirements contained herein are 
declared to be the maximum allowable, and sign types not specifically allowed 
as set forth within this chapter shall be prohibited. Where other ordinances 
are in conflict with the provisions of this ordinance, the most restrictive 
ordinance shall apply-
Sec. 22-33-3. Exceptions. 
(1) When a parcel of land is five (5) acres, or larger, the Planning 
Commission may consider an on-premise sign proposal for a development on 
such parcel that is less restrictive than the regulations set forth herein, 
as a conditional use providing there is a determination that the proposed 
sign exceptions are: 
(a) Not iu conflict with the purpose of this chapter. 
(b) In architectural harmony with the development and 
other buildings and uses adjacent to the development* 
(135) 
Sign Ordinance 22-33-3 - 22-33-4 
(2) Signs not regulated by this chapter: 
(a) On-premise advertising signs that are attached to windows 
or walls and are clearly of a temporary nature, which 
promote specific sales. 
(b) Signs which are associated with school or church events 
and functions, which are clearly of a temporary nature. 
(c) Interior signs, 
(d) Time and temperature devices. 
Sec. 22-33-4. Definitions. 
Alterations- A change or rearrangement in the structural parts or design 
whether by extending on a side, by increasing in area or height, or by re-
locating or change in position. 
Nonconforming Sign or Sign Structure. A sign or sign structure or portion 
thereof lawfully existing at the effective date of this chapter which does 
not conform to all height, area, yard spacing, animation, lighting or other 
regulations prescribed in the zone in which it is located. 
Sign. "Sign11 shall mean and include every advertising message, announcement, 
declaration, demonstration, display, illustration, insignia surface or space 
erected or maintained in view of the observer thereof for identification, 
advertisement or promotion of the interests of any person, entity, product, 
or service. Sign shall also include the sign structure supports, lighting 
system and any attachments, ornaments or other features used to draw the 
attention of observers, 
"A"1 Frame Sign. Temporary and/or movable sign constructed with 
two sides attached at the top so as to allow the sign to stand 
in an upright position. (Figure 1). 
Advertising Sign. Off-premise sign. 
Animated Sign. A sign which induces motion or rotation of any part 
by mechanical, or artificial means, or subdued color changes* 
Balloon Si^n. Advertisement supported by a balloon anchored to the 
premises where the advertised use is conducted, product or commodity 
sold, service performed, or business name is located. 
Billboard Sign. An off-premise advertising sign. 
Business Sign. An on-premise sign. 
Construction Sign. A sign identifying an existing or proposed 
development project which may contain the name of the project, name 
and address of construction firms, architects, engineers, developers, 
etc. 
Flashing Sign. A sign which has or appears to have motion or 
rotation of the lighting elements or displays flashing or inter-
mittent light. 
(136) 
Sign Ordinance 22-.33-4 ~ 22-33-4 
Flat Sign, A sign erected parallel to and attached to the outside 
wall of a building and extending not more than twenty-four (24) 
inches fro™ such wall with messages or copy on the face side only* 
(Figure 10) 
Flood 1 i_ght:edSign« A sign made legible in the absence of daylight 
by devices which reflect or project light upon it* 
Ground Sign. A sign supported by a fixed permanent frame support 
in the ground. (Figure 11) 
Illuminated Sign- A sign which has characters, letters, fLgures, 
designs, or outlines illuminated by electric lights or luminous 
tubes. 
Interior Sign* A sign located within a building so as to be visible 
only from within the building in which the sign is located. 
Mobile, Changeable Copy Sj^n. A sign mounted on trailer oir frame, 
lighted or unllghted, with changeable lettering. (Figure 13) 
Monument Sign* A sign which is incorporated into the landscape or 
architectural design scheme and displaying the name of uses or 
buildings• (Figure 14) 
Name Plate Sign. A sign indicating the name and/or occupation of 
a person legally occupying the premise or indicating a legal home 
occupation thereon. 
Off-Premise Signs. An advertising sign which directs attention to 
a use, product, commodity, or service not related to the premises 
on which the sign is located. 
On-Premise Sign, A sign directing attention to a use conducted, 
product or commodity sold, service performed or business name upon 
the premises on which it is located. 
Overhanging Sign, A sign which projects twelve (12) inches or more 
over the roof of a building. (Figure 15) 
Pedestal Si fin» A temporary and/or movable &ign supported by a 
column(s) and a base so as to allow the sign to stand in an upright 
position. (Figure 16) 
Projecting Sign. A sign attached to a building or canopy and ex-
tending in whole or part more than twenty-four (24). inches beyond 
any wall of the building or canopy. (Figure 17) 
Property Sign. A sign related to the property upon which it is 
located and offering such information as address, name of occupant 
for residential uses, sale or lease of the property, warning 
against trespassing, any hazard, or other danger on the property. 
(137) 
Sign Ordinance 22-33-4 - 22-33-4 
Zl9.g9£LQg.g.Jr-Board Sign, A permanently attached changeable copy wifcr, 
not exceeding twenty (20) square feet per face with one or two f '.uie.s 
back to back for the display of promotional items offered for sale on 
the premises* 
Roof Sign* A sign which is erected partly or wholly on the roof of the 
building. Not withstanding the foregoing, a sign structure having main 
supports embedded in the ground shall not be considered t:o be a roof 
sign even if the sign's supports pass through a roof, canopy, or parapet 
of a building. (Figure 18) 
Service Sign. A sign that is incidental to use lawfully occupying the 
property upon which the sign is located and which sign is necessary to 
provide information to the public, such as direction to parking lots, 
location of restrooms, entrance and exits, etc* A service sign shall 
also include signs providing information about sale of agricultural 
products produced upon the premises. 
Snipe Sign, A sign which is attached to a public utility pole, or the 
supports for another sign. (Figure 19) 
Temporary Sign. "Temporary Sign" as regulated by this title shall 
include any sign, banner, pennant, valance or advertising display con-
structed of paper, cloth, canvas, light fabric, cardboard, wallboard or 
other light materials, with or without frames, intended to be displayed 
out of doors for a short period of time. 
Time and Temperature Device, Any mechanism that displays the time and/or 
temperature,, but does not display any commercial advertising or 
identification. 
Wall Sign. A sign that is either painted on a wall or its facing, by 
not having a sign frame or separation from the wall or facing. 
(Figure 20) 
Window Sifin. A sign permanently attached and located within a building 
so as to be visible through a window or door outside of the building. 
(Figure 21) 
Electronic Message Center. A mechanism or device which uses a com-
bination of lights or lighted panels which are controlled electrically 
and electronically to produce words, symbols or messages which may 
flash) travel or scintillate within a given panel area. 
Sign Area. The area of a sign that is used for display purposes, 
excluding the minimum frame and supports. In computing sign area, only 
one side of a back-to-back or double-faced sign shall be computed when 
signs are parallel or diverge from a common edge by an angle of not 
more than forty-five degrees. 
In relation to signs that do not have a frame or a separate background, 
sign area shall be computed on the basis of the least rectangle, 
triangle or circle large enough to frame the display. 
(138) 
Sign Ordinance 22-33-4 - 22-33-7 
Sign areas in the shapp. of n sphere, prism, cylinder, cone, pyramid, 
square or other such shapes shall be computed as one-half (h) of the 
total surface area. {Figures 2-9) 
Sign Maintenance, "Sign Maintenance" shall mean that signs shall be 
maintained in a safe, presentable and good condition, including the 
replacement of defective parts, repainting, cleaning, and othw acts 
required for the maintenance of said sign* 
Sign Setback* The minimum distance that any portion of a sigr or sign 
structure shall be from any street right-of-way line and yard line 
coterminous with a street. 
Sign Structure, Anything constructed or erected supporting a sign 
which requires locations on or below the ground or attached to 
something having location on or below the ground. 
Sec, 22-33-5. Signs to Conform. Except as provided in this title: 
(1) A sign shall not be erected, raised, moved, placed, reconstructed, 
extended, enlarged or altered, unless in conformity with the regulations 
herein specified* 
A nonconforming sign shall not be reconstructed, raised, moved, placed, 
extended, or enlarged unless said sign is changed so as to conform to all 
provisions of this title. Alterations shall also mean the changing of the 
text or message that the sign is conveying from one use of the premise to 
another use of the premise and the changing of the ownership of the sign when 
that ownership necessitates a change in the text or message of the ?:ign. 
Alterations shall not be interpreted to include changing the text or copy of 
off-premise advertising signs, theatre signs, outdoor bulletin or other 
similar signs which are designed to accommodate changeable copy. 
Sec. 22-33-6. Building Permit Exceptions. Property signs, political signs 
and nameplates conforming to the provisions of this chapter may be erected 
without a permit. (See Section 22-33-3(2)* 
Sec, 22-33-7, Permit Tag. Each new sign requiring a building permit after 
the effective date of this chapter, and complying with this ordinance, shall 
have affixed to the sign a certification tag, issued by the Planning Director, 
visible from the sidewalk or nearest convenient location, 
(1) Tag Data, Each tag shall be of a weatherproof material and shall 
have the permit number of the sign for which it is issued and a date or 
code number which corresponds to the issuance record retained in the 
county office which issues the tag, 
(2) Tag Issuance. The tag shall be issued by the Building Inspection 
office at the time the sign permit is issued and the permit fee paid. 
(3) Tag Installation. Inspection tags shall be applied only to the 
signs for which they are issued by the sign contractor or the sign 
owner to certify to the Building Inspection Department that the place-
ment and construction of the signs are in conformance with representations 
made in permit applications, and that work is completed. 
(139) 
Sign Ordinance 22-33-8 - 22-33-11 
Sec, 22-33-8. Legal Action. 
(1) The Board of County Commissioners or County Attorney shall be 
empowered to institute any appropriate action or proceeding in any case 
where any sign is erected, constructed, reconstructed, altered, repaired, 
converted, or maintained, or in any case where any sign is used in violation 
of any County Ordinance, to accomplish the following purposes: 
(a) To prevent such unlawful erection, construction, recon-
struction, alteration, repair, conversion, maintenance, 
or use• 
(b) To restrain, to correct or abate such violation. 
(c) To abate and remove unsafe or dangerous sign. If an unsafe 
or dangerous sign is not repaired or made safe within ten 
(10) working days after giving notice as provided in Sub-
section (2) below, the Building Inspector or Planning 
Director may at once abate and remove said sign, and the 
person having charge, control or benefit of any such sign 
shall pay to Salt Lake County the costs incurred in such 
removal within thirty (30) calendar days after written 
notice of the costs is mailed to such person, 
(2) Notice by the County shall mean written notice sent by certified 
mail to persons having charge or control or benefit of any sign found by the 
Building Inspector or Planning Director to be unsafe. 
GENERAL SIGN PROVISION 
Sec. 22-33-9. Sisns Not to Constitute a Traffic Hazard. Signs or other 
advertising structures shall not be erected at the intersection of any streets 
or driveways in such manner as to obstruct free and clear vision; or at any 
location where by reason of the position, shape or color, it may interfere 
with, obstruct the view of or be confused with any authorized traffic sign, 
signal device, or make use of the words "Stop", "Drive-in11, "Danger11, or any 
other words, phrases, symbol or character in such a manner as to interfere 
with, mislead or confuse vehicle operators. 
Sec, 22-33-10. Clear View of Intersecting Streets. There shall be a minimum 
clearance of eight (8) feet between the ground and any part of a projecting 
sign or ground sign, as measured from the grade of the intersecting streets 
which are located within the clear view of an intersection as defined in 
Section 22-1-15. (Figure 22) 
.Sec. 22-33*11. Sjg;ns on Public Property. No sign shall be located on 
publicly owned land or inside street rights-of-way except signs required and 
erected by permission of an authorized public agency. Signs shall include> 
but not be limited to, handbills, posters, advertisements or notices that 
are fastened, placed, posted, painted or attached in any way upon any curb-
stone, lamp post, telephone pole, telegraph pole, electric light or power 
pole, hydrant, bridge, tree, rock, sidewalk, or street? 
(140) 
Sign Ordinance 22-33-12 - 22-33-18 
$ec._ 22-33-12, Pnjh^ bJjeJ_S.Lgug_-_ Signs not specifically allowed by this 
chapter" are prohibited- The foJl-'wuig uigns are specifically prohibited: 
tTAn frame, snipe and pedestal ciam;. 
Sec, 22-33-13, Maintenance of and Al.andcmroent of Sign, 
(1) All signs and advertising structures shall be maintained ir good 
condition. 
(2) Signs relating to a product no longer available for purchase, or 
to a business which has moved, shall be removed or the advertising copy 
removed within thirty (30) days of such unavailability, closure or relocation. 
See. 22-33-.14. Ownership> The imprint of the sign owner and sign erector 
of all signs shall be in plain and public view. 
Sec. 22-33-15. Lighted Signs, A lighted sign shall not be installed which 
permits the light to penetrate beyond the property in such a manner a-s to 
annoy or interfere with the use of adjacent properties;. 
Such lights alleged to violate the above by the adjacent property owners 
or Planning Director shall be subject to a public hearing before the Planning 
Commission as to the validity of the alleged violation. If such light: is 
determined to be in violation, the owner of said light shall take appropriate 
corrective action as directed. 
Sec, 22-33-16, Spacing Requirements for Off-Premise Signs, Off-premise 
signs erected along interstate highways on the primary system and on the 
federal aid system as defined by the State of Utah shall conform with the 
provisions of the Utah Outdoor Advertising Act. 
Sec. 22-33-17. Size Computation. The following shall be used when 
calculating sign sizes: 
When more than one use occupies a lot the frontage may be used to calculate 
the sign sizes for one total of a ground or projecting sign, not for each 
use. The total may then be divided between the uses. There may be any 
number of flat or wall signs provided their total does not exceed the 
percentage of wall area coverage allowed. 
Sec. 22-33-18, Mobile Changeable Copy Siftn. One mobi3e changeable copy 
sign may be used for each use for a period of sixty (60) days following the 
issuance of a permit to construct a permanent sign for that use. Upon in-
spection and approval of the permanent sign* tho mobile changeable copy sign 
must be removed. 
<U1) 
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Name Plate : 
Political 
Property 
Signs Allowed by Zones 
SIZE 
| 32 sq, ft. plus 1 sq. 
ft. for each 101 of 
frontage over 30 to 
a maximum of 96 sq, 
ft. per lot 
Construction signs 
located on the de-
velopment for 
subdivisions of 5 
lots or more, may be 
32 sq, ft, plus 2 sq. 
ft. for each ad-
ditional lot over 5 
to a maximum of 128 
sq, ft. total per 
subdivision 
Signs for subdivision 
of 5" lots or more and 
not located on the 
development may be 
32 sq- ft, plus 1 sq, 
ft. for each lot over 
5 to a maximum of 64 
sq, ft. per sign 
3 sq, ft. maximum i 
?er use 
16 sq, ft- maximum 
























not closer j 
than 10 ft. tq 
a driveway 1 
On private 
property 
- — * _ , L 
j OTHER 
Sign must he removn-c 
6 months from final 
building or condi-
tional use inspection 
that allow* occupancy 




All signs must be 
approved by the 
Planning CoiomJsslott 
for a period not tu 
exceed one year which 
may be renewed upon 
application received 
at least 30 days 
prior to the previous 
approval expiration 
date 
Shall be removed 15 
days following the 
final voting day 
(142) 










I 6 acj. ft- , 
32 sq* ft* plus 1 
I sq. ft. for every 10' 
of frontage over 30f 
to a maximum of 64 
sq, ft. 














|and set back 






One sign per street 
frontage and land-
scoped appropriately 
for the site. Allowed 
with public or quasi -
public buildings or 
uses* planned unit de-
velopments, golf 
courses, cemeteries, 
and dwelling groups 







Illumination may be built into or attached on to the signs listed above when: 
(1) Lighting is allowed in the specific zon 
(2) The devel opmenL occupies more tf lan 500 
e or 





street the sign will face and the sign is not closer than 100 feet to a 
property not allowed an illuminated sign 
(3) Flat signs that are exposed to dwellings on adjacent properties shall 




One per let 32 sq. 
ft. plus 1 sq, ft. 
for each 10 ft. of 
frontage over 30 ft. 
on a street but not 







Illumination may be 
built into or attached 
on to a &ign if the 
development occupies 
more than 5 30 ft. con-
tinuous froitage on a 
street that the sign 
will face (corner lots 
©ay use tot.al frontage) 
and not closer than 
60 ft. to a property 
not allowed an 
illuminated siftn. 
(143) 




>) C-l 1 
C-l-L 
C-V 1 













Flat sign may cover 
15E of a wall area 
Window signs may not 
exceed 8 sq. ft. per 
use 
One per lot 32 sq. ft. 
plus one square foot 
1 for every 10 feet of 
frontage over 30 to a 
maximum of 64 sq. ft. 
One per lot 65 sq. 
ft. plus one sq. ft. 
for each 4 ft. of 
frontage over 30, 
but not to exceed 128 
sq. ft. 
Window signs shall 
not exceed 12 sq» ft. 
per use | 
25Z ot a wall area 
See Section 22-33-18 
One per lot 32 sq. ft. 
plus 1 sq, ft. for 
every 4 ft. of front-
age over 30 to be a 1 
maximum of 63 sq. ft. 
HEIGHT 
















Flat signs that are 
exposed to dwellings 
on adjacent properties 
shall not be 
illuminated 
Window signs ehall 
not be illuminated 
A monument sign can 
only be utilized if 
no ground or 
projecting sign is 
used 
Illumination may be 
built into or 
attached on to a sign 
unless exposed to a 
dwelling on adjacent 
property 
" mt-£lgh'S' 'SXpOSfcd' 
to dwellings on ad-
jacent property shall 
not be Illuminated 
A monument sign can 
only be utilised if 
no ground or projecting 
sign is used 
(144) 

















Window signs shall 
not exceed 16 sq, ft* 
per use 
1 sq. ft. for each 
linear ft* of front-
age to a maximum of i 
20 sq. ft- per sign. 








ht, - J 



















I setback on 
ground or 
projecting, 
1 sign 300 
ft, front-
age or part 
thereof 
18-inch J 
min. set- J 
back, no j 
closer then! 









Illumination may be 
bailt into or at-
I tached to signs, 
[ Rotation and subdued 
light change may be 
allowed with con-
ditional approval. 
j Electee message 
j center signs are con-
ditional use in the 
1 C-2 Zone and per-
mitted use in the 
C-3 Zore 
Balloon signs are 
subject to con-
ditional use 
K6<5t £Tgn may sub-
j stitute for a ground 
or projecting sign 
but is subject to con-
ditional use review. 
The Planning Commissio; 
may deny a sign or set 
more restrictive con-
' ditions 
Maximum of I sign 
per street front 
and permanently 
anchored to the 
ground and subject 
to Conditional Use 
All sig,as must be 
within 500' of the 
freeway from which 
the grade level of the 
freeway is utilized to 
compute the height 
Spacing between off-
premise signs shall 
be 300r distance on 
one street side 
(M3) 























A maximum size of 




clusive of temporary {height 
cutouts and 
extensions 
25% of a vail area 
25% of a vail area 
Same as ground or 
projecting sign 
Window signs shall 






















shall be the 
sawe as re-
quired In 







1 sign per 




1 See Section 22-33-18 
Illumination may be 
built into or attached 
to sign* Electric 
message center signs 
are permitted -uses in 
the M-l and M-2 Zones 
Balloon signs are 
subject to 
Conditional Use 
Roof sign may substitute for a 
ground or projecting sign, but is 
subject to Conditional Vse review. 
The Planning Commission may deny a 
sign or set more restrictive 
conditions. 
See Section 22-33-18 
(146) 










Same as Sec. 
22-33*19(3) 




1 per lot 32 sq. ft 
plus 1 sq, ft* for 
every A ft, of front-
age over 30 to a 
























be the same 
as required 




A monument sign can 
only be utilized if 
no ground or 
projecting sign is 
] used 
All signs must be 
within 500 ft. of 
the freeway from 
which the grade 
level of the freeway 
is utilized to compute 
height. 
Spacing between off-
premise sign shall 
be 300 .ft* distance 
on one street side 
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